The question of whether quantum computing can destroy Bitcoin has long moved from theoretical discussions into the realm of practical calculations. Central to these concerns is Shor's algorithm, which radically changes the complexity of recovering a private key from a public one. While classical methods require on the order of 2¹²⁸ operations—unattainable for modern systems—the quantum approach turns this task into one solvable in minutes, provided the appropriate hardware exists.

The short answer

Theoretically, the threat is absolutely real. Shor's algorithm can solve the discrete logarithm problem on the secp256k1 elliptic curve in polynomial time, putting both ECDSA and Schnorr signatures at risk. However, no existing device has come close to the required power. Current processors boast around 1,100–1,200 physical qubits without error correction, whereas millions are needed for an attack. Moreover, addresses with already exposed public keys become the primary targets.

Why this is so

The key parameter is the "cost" of an attack in qubits. Researcher estimates vary by orders of magnitude, but conservative forecasts suggest the need for approximately 2,330 stable logical qubits, which, accounting for error correction, corresponds to 1–13 million physical qubits. Impressive progress was demonstrated by a Google Quantum AI study published in March 2026: according to it, fewer than 500,000 physical qubits and about 70 million computational steps suffice. This means a private key could be cracked in at most 9 minutes—faster than a new block is mined. This represents a twenty-fold reduction in requirements compared to 2019 projections.

Corporate plans are also telling. IBM aims to build a fault-tolerant quantum supercomputer with 200 logical qubits by 2029, while IonQ officially states it is developing a device with 2 million physical qubits by 2030. If these roadmaps are even partially realized, in the second half of the 2030s we could see a machine capable of recovering Bitcoin keys. However, Blockstream CEO Adam Back estimates a horizon of 20–40 years, and a survey of 26 experts from the Institute for Global Risk shows a 28–49% probability of a cryptographically significant quantum computer emerging within the next ten years.

Who is at risk

The vulnerability of assets is determined not by balance size but by the owner's digital hygiene. The main factor is an exposed public key. In the high-risk group are P2PK addresses from the Satoshi era, Taproot architecture, and wallets with address reuse. According to Glassnode estimates, keys for 6.04 million BTC (30.2% of the total supply) are exposed in the blockchain. Of these, 1.92 million BTC are tied to the structural vulnerability of P2PK, and 4.12 million BTC to the operational one associated with reuse.

The practical risk is compounded by the HNDL ("harvest now, decrypt later") strategy. An attacker does not need a quantum computer today—it is enough to save exposed keys and wait for the emergence of CRQC. A study by the U.S. Federal Reserve System explicitly points to Bitcoin as an example of the limitations of post-quantum migration: new algorithms will protect future transactions but will not hide already published data or automatically move funds from old outputs.

What this means

For holders, this is a reason not for panic but for a thorough audit. It is worth checking whether funds are on P2PK outputs or reused addresses, and whether long-term savings are stored in wallets with exposed public keys. Keys under control can be transferred, but "sleeping" wallets from the early years have no one to migrate—they will be the first targets.

For investors, narrative risk is equally important. The price may react long before a real attack: a single high-profile publication about reduced qubit requirements is enough for the market to start pricing in quantum risks. Two horizons are at play here—technological (ten or more years) and narrative (any upcoming quarter). Regulators, including the NSA and NCSC, are already preparing the transition to post-quantum cryptography, and Bitcoin will sooner or later have to coordinate migration through consensus—a process that proceeds significantly slower than the updating of commercial vendors' roadmaps.

My conclusion: the quantum threat is not tomorrow's collapse, but neither is it distant fantasy. Those most vulnerable are those who ignore basic security principles: address reuse and storing funds on outdated output types. The market, meanwhile, will react to every significant advance in quantum computing, creating volatility long before the first key is actually cracked.