Crypto news

Executive Director of RAKIB Alexander Brazhnikov presented an unexpected perspective on the Central Bank's initiative to legalize bitcoin, Ethereum, and USDT on the exchange market. In his assessment, the regulator's proposal creates fundamentally new infrastructure, but the annual limit of 300,000 rubles for non-qualified investors turns retail access into a formal gesture rather than a real financial instrument.

For the mass investor, a fully legal channel for investing in digital assets through domestic intermediaries appears for the first time. However, the 300,000 rubles per year threshold at each broker significantly limits the scale: most active users accustomed to turnovers several times higher will continue to work through foreign platforms and P2P exchangers.

What the Central Bank's proposal changes

Today, cryptocurrency trading in Russia relies on P2P platforms, foreign exchanges, and exchangers. This "gray" sector carries a whole set of risks: card blocks, fraud, lack of consumer protection, and periodic account freezes at the request of international regulators.

For the qualified investor, the picture is fundamentally different. There are no restrictions either on amounts or on the list of assets — all cryptocurrencies admitted to trading on the exchange and over-the-counter markets are available. This opens the door to a full-fledged market for professional participants.

Such a configuration, according to the expert, could become a signal for wealthy investors and spur an influx of institutional capital. Transparent rules reduce uncertainty for those who previously avoided cryptocurrencies due to the risk of blocks and the unclear status of the asset.

The "gray" sector has not yet received a decisive incentive to come out of the shadows. For organizations with multi-million turnovers, existing restrictions are unlikely to prove more attractive than familiar schemes.

Nevertheless, the very fact of legal infrastructure emerging can reduce the uncontrolled zone of the market. Even a moderate flow of operations into the legal framework changes the proportions.

Impact on the economy

The first effect is related to legalization and increased tax revenues. A significant portion of Russians' cryptocurrency operations passes through P2P and foreign exchanges, and taxes on them are only partially paid. The Central Bank's project creates supervised intermediaries, which will bring billions of rubles to the treasury annually — licensed brokers, exchangers, and management companies will pay income tax, VAT, and insurance premiums.

The second effect is a tool for cross-border settlements. The Central Bank has already confirmed its readiness to allow a limited circle of companies to use digital currencies in foreign trade operations. Such a tool does not depend on SWIFT, correspondent accounts in dollars and euros, or freezes by Western regulators.

Direct settlements in cryptocurrency eliminate multi-stage schemes with foreign currency and offshore structures, reducing costs and risks in foreign trade.

The third effect is the investment climate. Transparent rules attract wealthy investors; money that flowed abroad may remain in the Russian financial system. An industry forms around the market — custodial services, crypto brokers, analytical platforms, management companies — creating jobs and a tax base.

Key risks

The first risk the expert names is sanctions and geopolitical pressure. Creating a cryptocurrency market in Russia will almost certainly attract the attention of Western regulators, and the risk of secondary sanctions for Russian brokers, exchangers, and their clients is quite real.

Particular danger lies in the use of USDT: the stablecoin issuer can freeze addresses linked to Russian companies at the request of foreign authorities. This creates a false sense of reliability for a tool that could be blocked at a critical moment.

The second risk is concentration among intermediaries. A limited number of licensed brokers and exchangers forms points of risk concentration: if such an intermediary is hacked, goes bankrupt, or commits fraud, the damage will be very large, and insurance mechanisms for crypto assets are currently absent.

The third risk is the growth of fraud under the guise of legitimate actions. The official status of cryptocurrencies can be exploited by malicious actors: pseudo-brokers will appear posing as licensed organizations, along with schemes promising guaranteed returns. Citizens who believe in state approval will become more vulnerable.

The fourth risk is monopolization. Large players who first obtain licenses may lobby for stricter requirements for newcomers, leading to high fees, lower service quality, and in the long term, hindering the industry's development.

How this looks against global practice

Russia is building its own model, and the 300,000 rubles per year limit for non-qualified investors is its most distinctive part. In the US, EU, Brazil, South Korea, and Japan, there are no fixed limits on purchasing cryptocurrencies for citizens: protection is built through mandatory risk disclosure and regulator warnings, not through limiting amounts.

The second difference is the narrow list of assets. The requirement of a five-year price history and a list of only three assets place Russia among the most conservative countries. Even Japan, the only major economy with a "whitelist," admits dozens of assets under more flexible criteria. The Russian approach is a deliberate rejection of almost the entire altcoin market.

The third is the division into qualified and non-qualified investors. This is a transfer of the traditional Russian model of securities market regulation to cryptocurrencies: such a division is atypical for crypto exchanges, where usually a retail investor can buy any available cryptocurrency.

As a result, an "elite" legal market is created for large capital and a limited one for everyone else. This is more of an experiment dictated by the Central Bank's current policy than a well-thought-out development strategy.

The sanctions factor adds uniqueness: most of the mentioned countries are integrated into the global financial system, whereas for Russia, many Western exchanges have closed or restricted access. Therefore, the domestic regulated market is initially built as isolated — relying on internal liquidity and a limited circle of friendly counterparties.

My conclusion: the Central Bank's proposal is a cautious step toward legalization, but it creates a two-tier system where the mass investor gets only symbolic access. Until the limit is revised, the market will remain niche, and the bulk of trading volume will continue to leak into the gray zone. For real industry development, either raising the threshold or abandoning it in favor of investor information protection will be required.