Crypto news

RAKIB Executive Director Alexander Brazhnikov presented a mixed assessment of the Central Bank's initiative to allow Bitcoin, Ethereum, and USDT into exchange trading. On one hand, this is a step toward creating legal infrastructure, but on the other, the 300,000 ruble annual limit for non-qualified investors turns retail access into a symbolic gesture rather than a real financial tool.

In essence, we are witnessing the formation of a two-tier market. For the mass investor, a fully legal way to enter cryptocurrency through domestic intermediaries appears for the first time. However, the 300,000 ruble threshold per intermediary significantly limits the scale: most active users accustomed to turnovers many times higher will likely continue operating through foreign platforms and P2P networks.

What the Central Bank's proposal changes

Today, cryptocurrency trading in Russia relies on P2P platforms, foreign exchanges, and exchangers. This gray sector carries a whole set of risks: bank card blocks, fraud, lack of consumer protection, periodic account freezes for Russians at the request of international regulators, and claims from law enforcement agencies.

For the qualified investor, the picture is different. There are no restrictions either on amounts or on the list of assets—all cryptocurrencies admitted to trading on the exchange and over-the-counter markets are available. This opens the door to a full-fledged market for professional participants.

Such a configuration could serve as a signal for wealthy investors and spur an inflow of institutional capital. Transparent rules reduce uncertainty for those who previously avoided cryptocurrencies due to risks of freezes and the unclear status of the asset.

At the same time, the "gray" sector has not yet received a decisive incentive to come out of the shadows. For organizations with multi-million turnovers, existing restrictions are unlikely to prove more attractive than their usual schemes.

Impact on the economy

The first effect is legalization and growth in tax revenues. A significant portion of Russians' cryptocurrency transactions today passes through P2P, foreign exchanges, and exchangers, with taxes paid only partially. The Central Bank's project creates a legal structure with supervised intermediaries. Given market volumes, even a moderate share of transactions could bring billions of rubles in taxes to the treasury annually, while licensed brokers, exchangers, and management companies will pay profit tax, VAT, and insurance premiums. Miners, who currently retreat to P2P, will be able to officially sell cryptocurrency through regulated intermediaries.

The second effect is a tool for cross-border settlements. The Central Bank has already confirmed its readiness to allow a limited circle of companies to use digital currencies in foreign trade operations, and the admission of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and USDT to public circulation creates the legal foundation for this.

Such a tool does not depend on SWIFT, correspondent accounts in dollars and euros, or freezes by Western regulators, which reduces costs and risks in foreign trade. Direct settlements in cryptocurrency eliminate multi-step schemes involving foreign currency and offshore structures.

The third effect is the investment climate. Transparent rules attract wealthy investors, money that flowed abroad may remain in the Russian financial system, and an industry forms around the market—custodial services, crypto brokers, analytical platforms, management companies—creating jobs and a tax base.

Key risks

Brazhnikov names sanctions and geopolitical pressure as the first risk. The creation of a cryptocurrency market in Russia will almost certainly attract the attention of Western regulators, and he considers the risk of secondary sanctions for Russian brokers, exchangers, and their clients quite real.

He separately highlights the use of USDT: the stablecoin issuer may freeze addresses linked to Russian companies at the request of foreign authorities. This creates a false sense of reliability for a tool that could be blocked at a critical moment.

The second risk is concentration among intermediaries. Admitting a limited number of licensed brokers and exchangers creates points of risk concentration: if such an intermediary is hacked, goes bankrupt, or commits fraud, the damage would be very large, and insurance mechanisms for crypto assets are currently absent.

The third risk is the growth of fraud under the guise of legitimate activity. The official status of cryptocurrencies may be exploited by malicious actors: pseudo-brokers will appear posing as licensed organizations, along with schemes promising guaranteed returns, and citizens who believe in state approval will become more vulnerable.

The fourth risk is monopolization. Large players who obtain licenses first may lobby for stricter requirements for newcomers, leading to high fees, declining service quality, and in the long term, slowing industry development.

How this looks against global practice

According to Brazhnikov's assessment, Russia is building its own model, and the 300,000 ruble annual limit for non-qualified investors is its most distinctive part. In the US, EU, Brazil, South Korea, and Japan, there are no fixed limits on cryptocurrency purchases for citizens: protection is built through mandatory risk disclosure and regulator warnings, not through limiting amounts.

The second difference is the narrow list of assets. The requirement of a five-year price history and a list of only three assets place Russia among the most conservative countries. Even Japan, the only major economy with a "white list," admits dozens of assets under more flexible criteria, while the Russian approach, the expert says, is a deliberate rejection of nearly the entire altcoin market.

The third is the division into qualified and non-qualified investors. Brazhnikov considers this a transfer of the traditional Russian model of securities market regulation to cryptocurrencies: such a division is atypical for crypto exchanges, where retail investors can usually buy any available cryptocurrency.

As a result, an "elite" legal market is created for large capital and a limited one for everyone else. In this form, according to Brazhnikov, it is more of an experiment dictated by the Central Bank's current policy.

The expert separately highlights the sanctions factor. Most of the mentioned countries are integrated into the global financial system, whereas for Russia, many Western exchanges have closed or restricted access, so the domestic regulated market is initially built as isolated—relying on internal liquidity and a limited circle of friendly counterparties.

My view: The Central Bank's initiative is not so much liberalization as a targeted adjustment of infrastructure to the needs of the state and big business. The 300,000 ruble limit is not protection for the retail investor but rather a filter that cuts off mass demand and maintains control over capital flows. In the long term, if the experiment proves successful, we may see gradual easing, but for now, the market remains a club for the chosen few.