Raids on "Gorbushka" and in "City": why targeted strikes will not stop shadow crypto exchange in Russia
Large-scale searches and detentions at Moscow's illegal crypto exchange points, including "Gorbushka" and "Moscow-City," are merely targeted strikes against fraudsters' infrastructure. They can temporarily paralyze specific schemes but do not eliminate the root cause of the gray market's existence in Russia. This is the conclusion I reach when analyzing the current situation and statements from industry participants, particularly the position of RACIB Director Alexander Brazhnikov.
The effect of such operations exists, but it is local and short-term. The raids hit a key link in the logistics of phone fraudsters. They cannot work directly with bank accounts — that is too risky due to oversight by FinCERT and blocks under Federal Law No. 115-FZ. Therefore, their schemes rely on illegal exchangers that accept cash from couriers, convert it into cryptocurrency, and transfer it to foreign wallets.
The strength of such raids lies in three aspects. First, they destroy a specific chain: the seizure of equipment and the freezing of channels give victims a chance to recover part of their funds, while criminal groups lose income and infrastructure. Second, they demonstrate the inevitability of punishment. Real arrests and the prospect of up to 10 years of imprisonment under Part 4 of Article 159 of the Criminal Code are a powerful deterrent for rank-and-file operatives. Third, every closed exchanger shrinks the market, forcing fraudsters to seek new intermediaries, which increases their costs and risks.
Why the problem is not being solved
However, the main reason for the existence of illegal exchangers is the lack of a full-fledged legal infrastructure for converting cryptocurrency. As long as Russia lacks a sufficient number of licensed platforms with clear rules, the demand for shadow services will not disappear but will merely change form. The infrastructure quickly recovers, moving into more hidden segments: P2P platforms, online exchangers, droppers, and crypto ATMs. Raids on physical addresses do not affect this digital ecosystem.
Moreover, detentions most often involve rank-and-file operatives — cashiers, operators, couriers. Scheme organizers, as a rule, are located abroad or use multi-level intermediary systems where operatives do not know each other. Criminal cases against "foot soldiers" do not stop the criminal business but merely create the appearance of active enforcement. Corruption risks should also be noted separately: physical exchangers cannot exist without "protection" — from landlords to local officials. As long as these connections are not exposed, the closure of some points will be offset by the opening of others under new patronage.
Risks for bona fide participants
In this legal uncertainty, law-abiding market players also suffer. Even when fully innocent, they may become targets of operational measures and blocks due to vague criteria. Raids in shopping centers damage landlords and neighboring stores, scaring away customers and creating a negative atmosphere.
Strategically, the problem cannot be solved without creating legal exchange infrastructure, controlling online channels, and internationally prosecuting organizers. Otherwise, the fraudulent conveyor belt will recover faster than law enforcement can conduct new searches. High-profile operations with masks and journalists are an understandable and necessary tool, but they work only as a tactical means of disrupting operations and gathering intelligence, not as a systemic solution.
My conclusion: until the regulator offers the market transparent and accessible mechanisms for legal exchange, the shadow sector will thrive. Raids are a fight against the symptom, not the cause. Without creating a full-fledged legal framework and a real alternative for users, any detentions, no matter how spectacular, will remain mere episodes in an endless game of cat and mouse.