Washington's Quantum Solitaire: Why the US Needs Clear Rules for Investing in Future Technologies
Quantum computing is perhaps one of the few sectors where direct government funding can truly be justified. However, as recent discussions in expert circles show, without clear and transparent rules, such support risks turning into a tool of political pressure or, worse, slowing down the development of the technology itself.
Unlike drones, batteries, or rare earth metal processing, where the government can stimulate the market through public procurement or regulation, the quantum field is at a stage where commercial products are virtually nonexistent, the dominant architecture is undefined, and production chains are only just forming. This, in my view, is where the main dilemma lies: how to support breakthrough developments without creating dangerous dependencies or replacing market mechanisms with bureaucratic ones.
The connection between quantum technologies and national security is obvious. Scalable quantum computers could potentially break modern public-key cryptography in the future, while related developments find applications in sensors, navigation, and communications. Therefore, it is no surprise that the U.S. Department of Commerce, under the CHIPS and Science Act, has already announced the allocation of $2.013 billion for two quantum factories and seven companies. Among the recipients are IBM ($1 billion), GlobalFoundries ($375 million), as well as Atom Computing, D-Wave, Infleqtion, PsiQuantum, Quantinuum, Rigetti, and Diraq.
A condition of the support was that the government would receive a minority, non-controlling stake in each company. It was this clause that led Google to refuse participation, which is quite logical: the corporation believed that such requirements could slow down the path to creating a useful quantum computer. And here arises the key question: how to maintain a balance between the interests of taxpayers and the freedom of technological development?
Three principles for government investments
An analysis of the situation allows us to formulate three basic principles on which such investments should be built. First, government intervention is justified only when there is a clear threat to national security or a serious economic vulnerability that the market cannot address on its own. Second, funds should not be invested where a finished product can simply be purchased—in the case of quantum computing, this approach does not yet work, as the necessary products simply do not exist in industrial form. And finally, third, support should maintain a distance between the state and business.
In my view, warrants could be the optimal tool here—they give the government the right to participate in the growth of companies' value without full control over them. This allows taxpayers to benefit from successful projects without creating the political risks of direct share ownership.
The situation is compounded by the fact that the quantum threat problem is not limited to government systems. As I have already noted, for decentralized networks like Bitcoin, transitioning to post-quantum cryptography is a much more complex task—government decrees alone cannot solve it. And the recent launch by the U.S. Department of Defense of the Farseer program to develop quantum sensors with a budget of up to $200 million only confirms: the quantum arms race has already begun, and the stakes have never been higher.
Analyst's opinion: Quantum technologies are not just another hype, but a fundamental shift in the paradigm of computing and security. The U.S. is trying to find a middle ground between state capitalism and market freedom, but the success of this strategy will depend on how flexible and technologically neutral the developed rules turn out to be. Otherwise, we risk getting not a stimulus for innovation, but a new wave of bureaucratization that will only slow down progress.