Record Bankruptcies in the US: Illusion of a Crisis or a Hidden Threat? The Dual Reality of the Credit Market
The United States has recorded a record number of bankruptcies among large corporations for the second consecutive year. At first glance, this is an alarming signal pointing to deep problems in the economy. However, as my calculations and analysis of market data show, a more complex and ambiguous picture lies behind this figure. In reality, two fundamentally different credit systems are operating today under the single banner of the American economy, and their conditions are drastically different.
In the first half of 2026, 372 large companies filed for bankruptcy — the highest since 2010. The figure is nearly identical to last year's (371), suggesting not an explosive surge but a stagnation at a 16-year plateau. The increase was only 0.27%. The main impact hit the industrial sector (50 filings), the consumer sector (35), and healthcare (26). It is important to note that this refers specifically to public and large private companies, not the entire country's business landscape.
Two Worlds, Two Credit Approaches
The paradox is that while large businesses are stuck in neutral, the situation in the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) segment is diametrically opposite. The number of commercial Chapter 11 bankruptcies rose by 28% to 4,589, while small business reorganizations surged by 50% to 1,663. This indicates that large corporations with credit ratings and access to capital markets are refinancing debts and surviving, while small and private businesses, lacking such privileges, end up in court. In this case, the court acts not as a morgue but as a protective barrier: debt is converted into equity, and the business continues to operate. Last year, 61.2% of bankruptcies opted for reorganization rather than liquidation.
Hidden Risk in the Government Debt Market
An even more alarming trend, which almost no one talks about, is brewing in the U.S. Treasury bond market. Since 2007, the share of "price-insensitive" holders — central banks, the Federal Reserve, and commercial banks — has fallen from 75% to 52%. The vacated space has been taken by hedge funds, which conduct leveraged transactions financed by short-term repo loans.
This is where I see the main threat. When the repo market freezes, such funds are forced to sell off securities en masse and simultaneously, triggering a collapse. This already happened in March 2020, when the Fed had to intervene urgently. The situation is exacerbated by a $2 trillion annual budget deficit, which forces the issuance of more government debt, putting pressure on an already fragile market.
My conclusion as an analyst: the next crisis in the bond market will not come from yields. It will be caused not by the price of securities, but by whose hands they end up in. A market dominated by overleveraged speculators is a powder keg that could explode at any moment, and the consequences for all risky assets, including cryptocurrencies, will be immediate and catastrophic. Investors should prepare for a potential "tail risk event."