The U.S. is bringing private business into the cyber war: a new era in the fight against digital crime.
On August 12, the U.S. President signed a memorandum that radically changes the rules of the game in cybersecurity. The document authorizes certified private companies to participate in offensive cyber operations against foreign criminal syndicates. This is not just an expansion of authority—it is a shift from passive defense to active action, where business becomes a full-fledged tool of state policy.
The new program focuses on transnational groups engaged in ransomware, financial fraud, and other digital crimes. Private contractors are allowed not only to gather intelligence on their infrastructure but also to carry out targeted strikes—up to blocking, destabilizing, or completely destroying the equipment and data of the attackers.
Mechanics and oversight
Operational management is assigned to the National Coordination Center under the Department of Homeland Security, while the Department of Justice provides oversight. The key principle is that companies act exclusively "under the direction, control, and authority of the U.S. government." Independent selection of targets is strictly prohibited.
Participation in the program requires serious certification: technical competence, proven experience, and the security of one's own infrastructure. The financial barrier is also substantial—a bond or escrow account of at least $1 million, which may be confiscated in case of violations. Targets are strictly limited: only foreign criminal structures that are not part of another state's government.
Interestingly, preparations for this step have been underway for a long time. As early as March, a presidential decree ordered the creation of an operational cell and the involvement of the private sector in combating online fraud. The current memorandum merely formalizes these intentions, turning them into a full-fledged program with the right to offensive action.
First experience: Apple, Coinbase, and Google in action
Cooperation with tech giants is already bearing fruit. In May, the Scam Center Strike Force task force conducted a large-scale Disruption Week involving Apple, Coinbase, Google, Meta, Microsoft, SpaceX, and TRM Labs. Law enforcement shared data on fraudulent networks in Southeast Asia with partners, and companies independently identified accounts and infrastructure of the violators.
The results are impressive: more than 1.4 million blocked accounts, disabled servers and hosting, as well as the freezing of over $3.8 million in cryptocurrency used for money laundering. In Thailand, seven suspects were detained as a result of the joint effort.
However, such practice raises legitimate risks. Among the main concerns are retaliatory aggression from criminals, collateral damage to innocent parties, and difficulties in coordination between agencies. Let me remind you that, according to UN estimates, damage from scam operations in the Asia-Pacific region in 2025 reached $114.1 billion—the scale of the threat is obvious.
My analysis: This step is a logical evolution of public-private partnership, but it opens Pandora's box. Questions of jurisdiction, accountability, and escalation remain open. In the long term, we will need a clear international legal framework, otherwise we risk getting a digital "Wild West" where the boundaries between legitimate actions and cyberwarfare become completely blurred.