Cryptocurrency law in Russia: two payment circuits instead of one — a new reality
International transfers have always been a bottleneck in the global financial system. The average fee for sending $200 abroad is about 6.4%, while through a bank this figure can reach nearly 15%. At the same time, the payment order itself reaches the recipient bank in just ten minutes. The rest of the time and money is consumed by the so-called "last mile"—compliance checks, reconciliations, and crediting at the local bank.
This problem has become a catalyst for global changes in the regulation of digital assets. Last week, on August 4, the President of Russia signed the law "On Digital Currency and Digital Rights." Notably, just three weeks earlier, the United States legally banned its own digital dollar, Europe entered final negotiations on the digital euro, the Bank for International Settlements conducted settlements with real money in the Agorá project, and Mastercard closed the acquisition of a company specializing in stablecoin settlements.
All these events answer one key question, and the Russian response stands out: only here does the state build two payment rails simultaneously and regulate them differently.
The dispute is not about technology
The real subject of the debate is not the speed of message transmission. According to SWIFT statistics, three out of four payments reach the recipient bank in ten minutes. Time and money are consumed by the "last mile"—compliance checks, reconciliation, and crediting at the local bank.
The essence of the dispute is whose obligation you hold in your hands at the moment of settlement: the central bank's, a commercial bank's, a private issuer company's, or a payment network's. This determines whom to approach if a payment goes missing and who benefits from the funds while they sit in the system.
This balance is the raw material of the banking economy: it generates earnings, backs loans, and is the reason clients are retained. Nearly every decision of the past year is designed to keep the balance from leaving the banking system.
What the Russian law introduces
The law takes effect on September 1, 2026. Mandatory registration of crypto exchangers in the Bank of Russia registry begins on July 1, 2027, with some requirements for intermediaries from September 2027. A new category of professional participants emerges—digital depositories: they maintain records of clients' crypto assets, keep primary and backup IT infrastructure in Russia, and compensate damages in cases of unlawful write-offs. Crypto exchangers with own funds of at least 15 million rubles are legalized.
The criteria for admitting assets to trading are enshrined in the law itself: capitalization above 5 trillion rubles, average daily turnover above 1 trillion, and a trading history of at least five years. Bitcoin and ether currently meet these criteria. For non-qualified investors, a limit of 300 thousand rubles per year per intermediary is set, along with mandatory testing.
The provision that will affect practice sooner than others is settlements under foreign trade contracts. It has been in effect since September 2024 in an experimental mode by the Bank of Russia, and the new law grants it permanent status.
Domestic payments in cryptocurrency remain prohibited. Not only custodial wallets but also self-custody wallets are allowed; for withdrawals exceeding 100 thousand rubles to an external address, a 48-hour delay is provided—it will take effect on September 1, 2027.
The obligation to declare the very fact of ownership is not directly established—except for state and municipal employees. Two or more transactions per month exceeding 3.5 million rubles are considered by the law as a sign of organized activity requiring intermediary status.
Tax arises upon sale, not upon holding: 13% on income up to 2.4 million rubles and 15% above that, with a 3-NDFL declaration due by April 30. The holding-period exemption does not apply to digital currency. From July 1, 2027, banks are required to refuse transfers to unlicensed crypto services—the channel for funding foreign platforms through Russian banks closes.
Two rails instead of one
Domestically, from September 1, mandatory acceptance of the digital ruble begins—a state retail currency that the United States has legally banned until the end of 2030 and that Europe is still only designing. Externally, the circulation of private global assets is legalized. Both instruments are used simultaneously but separated by purpose: domestically—only the public rail, externally—only the private one.
The logic of the separation is simple when viewed through obligations. Domestically, the balance remains with the Bank of Russia: this ensures traceability of settlements and independence from external infrastructure. Externally, an asset issued by none of the transaction participants is used—which is why it works where correspondent channels have become difficult to navigate due to external restrictions.
The combination of public and private rails is not unique in itself—China, the UAE, and India do the same. The distinctiveness of the Russian model lies in the rigid segmentation by payment purpose, and it is shaped by external circumstances no less than by design.
The world, the market, and the practical takeaway
The American framework took shape over a year. The GENIUS Act (July 2025) requires full backing of stablecoins with liquid assets and directly prohibits accruing income to holders for the token. And on July 11, 2026, the ban on a retail central bank digital currency became law: until the end of 2030, the Fed is not authorized to issue a CBDC. Europe chose the opposite instrument: the digital euro is designed as a public alternative with zero yield and a holding limit, with a pilot planned for the second half of 2027 and the first issuance for 2029.
Mastercard closed the acquisition of BVNK on August 3, with an announced price of up to $1.8 billion, including about $300 million in contingent payments. The asset's value is largely regulatory: BVNK obtained a license under the MiCA regulation in Malta in February 2026, valid across the entire EU. In July, Visa launched a stablecoin issuance platform for banks.
Card networks are embedding new instruments into the settlement layer while retaining the client and the rules. The share of stablecoins in cross-border retail payments in 2025 was only 0.31%.
The only one to report settlements with real money is the Bank for International Settlements project. On July 30, results were published: about thirty participants, including five central banks, 30 transactions in six currencies totaling around one million dollars, with an average settlement time of 80 seconds versus several business days in correspondent practice. However, the platform operated autonomously, without connection to existing systems and without real compliance procedures.
Country trajectories diverge. Of the eleven BRICS countries, all are studying digital currencies, nine have reached the pilot stage, but none has fully launched a system. Since January 1, 2026, China has reclassified the digital yuan in commercial bank accounts as a deposit obligation—interest accrues on it and deposit insurance applies. India is moving in the opposite direction: the volume of digital rupee in circulation declined for the first time by 24% in FY 2025/26, and Brazil in November 2025 shut down the Drex platform, admitting that the technology failed to ensure privacy and security.
The digital ruble looks modest: as of July 1, over 25 million digital rubles were in circulation, about $320 thousand for the entire country—but in two months, acceptance becomes mandatory for companies with revenue above 120 million rubles.
Mandatory acceptance of the digital ruble creates a forced flow from bank balances into a central bank liability—exactly what everyone else avoids. The question for the next year and a half is not whether the rails of different countries will interconnect, but whether Russia will repeat the Chinese maneuver—accrue income or otherwise return the balance to banks. The answer will be visible in the dynamics of the deposit base by the end of 2027.
My analysis: The two-rail model is not just a regulatory experiment but a pragmatic response to external constraints. The domestic rail with the digital ruble ensures control and independence, while the external one—with cryptocurrency—provides a way to circumvent sanctions barriers. The key risk is the volatility of bitcoin and ether, which are admitted to trading, creating an independent risk for contracts with deferred payment. Investors should closely monitor the dynamics of the deposit base: if the central bank begins to accrue income on digital rubles, it will change the entire liquidity structure in the country.