Crypto news

Transferring $200 abroad costs on average 6.4% of the amount, while through a bank it is almost 15%. At the same time, the payment message itself reaches the recipient bank in ten minutes. This is a paradox that has defined the architecture of international settlements for decades: data delivery speed was never the bottleneck, but the "last mile"—compliance checks, reconciliations, and crediting at the local bank—eats up time and money.

Over the past month, five different approaches have attempted to close this gap. On August 4, the Russian president signed the law "On Digital Currency and Digital Rights." Three weeks earlier, the U.S. legislatively banned its own digital dollar, Europe entered final negotiations on the digital euro, the Bank for International Settlements conducted its first real-money settlements in the Agorá project, and Mastercard closed the acquisition of a company specializing in stablecoin settlements.

All five answer one question, and the Russian answer differs in one respect: only here does the state build two payment rails simultaneously and regulate them differently.

The dispute is not about technology

The bottleneck is not message transmission: according to SWIFT statistics, three out of four payments reach the recipient bank in ten minutes. Time and money are consumed by the "last mile"—compliance checks, reconciliation, and crediting at the local bank.

The real subject of the dispute becomes visible if you ask whose obligation you hold in your hands at the moment of settlement—the central bank's, the commercial bank's, the private issuer company's, or the payment network's. This determines who you turn to if a payment goes missing, and who benefits from the funds while they sit in the system.

This balance is the raw material of the banking economy: it generates earnings, backs loans, and keeps customers. Almost every decision of the past year is designed to keep the balance from leaving the banking system.

Leading engineer-analyst of the "Blockchain" division at Diasoft Mikhail Kulakov explains: the question "whose obligation is this" is a question of where the primary record is maintained and who has the right to change it. The central bank's obligation lives on the regulator's platform, the bank's own obligation lives in its accounting core, and the token issuer's obligation lives on a third-party network to which the bank has read-only access. Three answers yield three reconciliation models and three recovery scenarios in the event of a failure, and the "last mile" is largely the time spent aligning these records with each other, not a delay in data transmission.

What the Russian law introduces

The law takes effect on September 1, 2026, mandatory registration of crypto exchangers in the Bank of Russia registry—from July 1, 2027, and part of the requirements for intermediaries—from September 2027. A new category of professional participants emerges—digital depositories: they maintain records of clients' crypto assets, host primary and backup IT infrastructure in Russia, and compensate for damages in cases of unauthorized debits. Crypto exchangers with own funds of at least 15 million rubles are legalized.

The criteria for admitting assets to trading are enshrined in the law itself—capitalization above 5 trillion rubles, average daily turnover above 1 trillion, and a trading history of at least five years, all averaged over two years. Today, bitcoin and ether fall under these criteria. For non-qualified investors, a limit of 300 thousand rubles per year per intermediary is set, along with mandatory testing.

The provision that will affect practice sooner than others is settlements under foreign trade contracts. It has been in effect since September 2024 in an experimental mode by the Bank of Russia, and the new law makes it permanent.

Domestic cryptocurrency payments remain prohibited. Not only custodial wallets but also self-custody ones are permitted; for withdrawals exceeding 100 thousand rubles to an external address, a 48-hour delay is provided—it will take effect on September 1, 2027.

The Central Bank's list itself does not prohibit holding assets outside it: the criteria apply to public offerings through Russian intermediaries, not to ownership rights, and digital currency is recognized as property with judicial protection. Foreign and non-custodial wallets are not prohibited, and the holder of the access key is recognized as the owner.

The obligation to declare the very fact of ownership is not directly established—except for state and municipal employees. Two or more transactions per month exceeding 3.5 million rubles are considered by the law as a sign of organized activity requiring intermediary status.

Tax arises upon sale, not holding: 13% on income up to 2.4 million rubles and 15% above that, with a 3-NDFL declaration due by April 30. The holding-period exemption applicable to certain types of property does not apply to digital currency, according to Ministry of Finance clarifications. From July 1, 2027, banks are required to refuse transfers to unlicensed crypto services—the channel for funding foreign platforms through Russian banks closes.

Two rails instead of one

Domestically, starting September 1, mandatory acceptance of the digital ruble begins—a state retail currency that the U.S. has legislatively rejected until the end of 2030 and that Europe is only designing so far. Externally, the circulation of private global assets is legalized. Both instruments are used simultaneously but separated by purpose: domestically—only the public rail, externally—only the private one.

The logic of the separation is simple when looking at obligations. Domestically, the balance remains with the Bank of Russia: this provides traceability of settlements and independence from external infrastructure—while simultaneously raising the same privacy question that led the U.S. to abandon the retail model.

Externally, an asset is used that no transaction participant issues—which is why it works where correspondent channels have become difficult to navigate due to external restrictions in recent years. The sanctions context is not named in the law, but it is the most obvious explanation for the foreign trade provision: the issue is not the transfer fee but the availability of the channel itself.

The combination of public and private rails is not unique in itself—China, the UAE, and India do the same. The distinctiveness of the Russian model lies in the rigid segmentation by payment purpose, and it is shaped by external circumstances no less than by design.

The divergence in trajectories is explained not only by regulatory but also architectural choices, Kulakov adds. Retail central bank projects in BRICS are built on centralized platforms where the distributed ledger is used selectively. Stablecoins live in the opposite paradigm—public networks, an open ledger, no single operator. Therefore, two rails are not two interfaces but two different data models: in one, the platform operator creates the record; in the other, the network creates it, and the bank only observes, with the main work falling on the reconciliation layer between them.

The world, the market, and the practical takeaway

The American construct took shape over a year. The GENIUS Act (July 2025) requires full backing of stablecoins with liquid assets and explicitly prohibits paying holders income on tokens. And on July 11, 2026, the ban on a retail central bank digital currency became law: until the end of 2030, the Fed is not authorized to issue a CBDC. Europe chose the opposite instrument.

According to ECB data, in 2022 international card schemes accounted for 61% of eurozone card payments, and thirteen countries depend on them entirely. That is why the digital euro is being designed as a public alternative with zero yield and a holding limit; the regulation has not been adopted, a pilot is planned for the second half of 2027, and the first issuance for 2029.

Mastercard closed the acquisition of BVNK on August 3, with the announced March price of up to $1.8 billion, including about $300 million in contingent payments. The asset's value is largely regulatory: BVNK obtained a MiCA license in Malta in February 2026, valid across the entire EU. In July, Visa launched a stablecoin issuance platform for banks.

Card networks are embedding new instruments into the settlement layer while retaining the customer and the rules: they do not need the balance; they earn on the flow. The share of stablecoins in cross-border retail payments in 2025 was 0.31%.

The only one to report real-money settlements is the Bank for International Settlements project. Results were published on July 30: about thirty participants, including five central banks, 30 transactions in six currencies totaling around one million dollars, with an average settlement time of 80 seconds versus several business days in correspondent practice. However, the platform operated autonomously, without connection to existing systems and without real compliance procedures.

The engineering value of Agorá is that there is no need to migrate accounting anywhere: the tokenized deposit remains the obligation of the same bank, the ledger handles atomicity and synchronization, and no data migration is required, Kulakov explains. But compliance checks, sanctions screening, and dispute resolution remained outside the scope, and these constitute the "last mile"—so 80 seconds remain a characteristic of the settlement layer, not of the end-to-end payment.

Country trajectories diverge. Of the eleven BRICS countries, all are studying digital currencies, nine have reached the pilot stage, but none has launched a full-scale system.

China, from January 1, 2026, reclassified the digital yuan in commercial bank accounts as a deposit obligation—interest accrues on it and deposit insurance applies, meaning Beijing decided to return the balance to banks through yield.

India is moving in the opposite direction: the volume of the digital rupee in circulation shrank for the first time by 24% in the 2025/26 fiscal year, and Brazil in November 2025 shut down the Drex platform, admitting that the technology failed to ensure privacy and security.

The digital ruble looks modest—as of July 1, over 25 million digital rubles were in circulation, about $320 thousand for the entire country—but in two months, acceptance becomes mandatory for companies with revenue above 120 million rubles.

For foreign trade participants, the law removes part of the legal uncertainty within the Russian framework, but it does not regulate the external side of the transaction: the foreign counterparty's willingness to accept a payment is determined by its own compliance and assessment of sanctions risk.

Bitcoin and ether, admitted to trading, are volatile, and that is an independent risk for a contract with deferred payment.

Mandatory acceptance of the digital ruble creates a forced flow from bank balances into a central bank obligation—exactly what everyone else avoids. The question for the next year and a half is not whether the rails of different countries will interconnect, but whether Russia will repeat China's maneuver—accrue yield or otherwise return the balance to banks. The answer will be visible in the dynamics of the deposit base by the end of 2027.

My conclusion as an analyst: the Russian model is a pragmatic response to external constraints, not an ideological choice. The separation of rails reduces sanctions risks for foreign trade but creates internal tension: mandatory acceptance of the digital ruble without a yield mechanism could provoke