Banking spreads on cryptocurrency in Russia: why competition will inevitably crush the margin
The launch of cryptocurrency banking operations in Russia starts with inflated spreads that will be noticeably higher than on classic crypto exchanges. However, maintaining a markup of 5–7% or more in a competitive market will not be possible. This is a fundamental conclusion I reach when analyzing the structure of the future market.
The key factor determining the price for the client is not the bank's appetite for profit, but the aggregate of costs: the cost of liquidity, the client's willingness to pay for a regulated framework, and the difference compared to familiar fiat transfer channels. At the start, banks will have to factor into the price the costs of compliance, hedging, and building new infrastructure, which will inevitably drive margins up to several basis points in certain products.
Why high spreads are a temporary phenomenon
I do not see sustainable prerequisites for maintaining spreads of 5–7% or higher. As soon as several banks and other regulated players enter the market, margins will begin to compress fairly quickly. The market, not the regulator, will shape the final spread. It is composed of the global price of the crypto asset plus the cost of liquidity, hedging, infrastructure, and the specific bank's margin.
The Central Bank of Russia, as I note in my analytical materials, will focus on access rules, the composition of participants, and infrastructure, but will not set fixed buy and sell quotes. Therefore, the markup may vary significantly across different banks, and within a single bank, the spread will depend on the number of active users, the volume of real client liquidity, and the cost of proprietary liquidity that must be held on the balance sheet.
Who will win the battle for the client
Victory will go to those with a larger marketing budget and a higher willingness to take risks to dominate the new economy. This is not only about qualified investors. The more liquidity providers and competition among banks, the closer prices will be to market levels. The mechanism here resembles the currency market, not a product with an administratively set tariff.
The mass client today is not ready to pay just for the word "bank." Since 2022, the level of stress among the retail audience has been high: the Russian user is willing to accept many scenarios to meet their needs, except one—an unjustifiably high cost of service. The picture is different for affluent clients. Large capital continues to move between countries, and with an average transaction size of 3–5 million rubles, a person is willing to pay for speed, transparency, and the absence of problems. Which such a client will prefer—their own accountant or a Russian bank—is a rhetorical question.
My conclusion: the market will quickly weed out inefficient players. Banks that can offer a competitive margin through liquidity scaling will take a dominant position. The rest will have to either move into niche products for premium clients, where the willingness to pay is higher, or leave the market. Spreads of 5–7% are not the new norm, but merely a starting point for a race in which the strongest will survive.