Competition will bring down bank spreads on cryptocurrency in Russia
The launch of cryptocurrency banking operations in Russia will be marked by inflated spreads that will significantly exceed the indicators of classic crypto exchanges. However, it is unlikely that market players will be able to maintain a markup of 5–7% or higher amid competitive pressure. I draw this conclusion based on an analysis of the current dynamics and structure of the emerging market.
The key factor determining the price for the client is not the bank's pursuit of excess profits, but the real cost of liquidity, the client's willingness to pay for a regulated framework, and the difference compared to familiar fiat transfer channels. At the start, banks will be forced to factor into the price the costs of liquidity, compliance, hedging, and the creation of new infrastructure. In certain products, the markup could reach several basis points, and in some cases, even more.
Why high spreads are a temporary phenomenon
I do not consider spreads of 5–7% and higher to be sustainable in a competitive market. As soon as several banks and other regulated participants enter the arena, margins will begin to shrink rapidly. The spread itself will be shaped by the market, not the regulator. Its structure will consist of the global price of the crypto asset, the cost of liquidity, hedging, infrastructure expenses, and the specific bank's margin.
The Bank of Russia, as I expect, will focus on access rules, the composition of participants, and market infrastructure, rather than on setting specific buy and sell quotes. Therefore, markups across different banks may vary significantly, especially at the initial stage.
Who will win the battle for the client
Within an individual bank, the spread will depend on the number of active product users, the volume of real user liquidity in the order book, and the cost of liquidity for the bank itself, which will have to be maintained on the balance sheet in significant amounts. Infrastructure costs and the legal structure will remain secondary factors.
The winner will be the one with a larger marketing budget and a greater willingness to take risks for a dominant position in the new economy. This is not only about qualified investors. The more liquidity providers and competition among banks, the closer prices will be to market levels. The mechanism here resembles the foreign exchange market, not a product with an administratively set tariff.
The mass client is not ready to pay for the mere word "bank." Since 2022, the stress level of the retail audience has been high: the Russian user is willing to accept many scenarios to meet their needs, but not an unjustifiably high cost of service. The picture is different for wealthy clients. Large capital continues to move between countries, and with an average transaction of 3–5 million rubles, a person is willing to pay for speed, transparency, and the absence of problems. The question of whom such a client will prefer—their own accountant or a Russian bank—is rhetorical.
My conclusion: a short-term period of high spreads is inevitable, but it will not last long. The market will quickly find equilibrium, and banks that fail to offer competitive terms will lose both retail and institutional clients. The key battle will be fought not over margins, but over trust and speed of service.