Crypto news

16.08.2026
03:05

Russia's cryptocurrency strategy: two circuits instead of one — what will change for the market

The average cost of sending $200 abroad is 6.4% of the amount, while a bank transfer would cost nearly 15%. At the same time, the payment message itself reaches the recipient bank within ten minutes. This is a striking illustration of where the main costs and time delays are concentrated in the modern financial system.

All the remaining time and virtually all the money go toward what happens after the message is delivered. Over the course of one month, five different approaches were attempted to close this gap—and this is precisely where the essence of the global transformation of payment infrastructure lies.

Russia's response: two circuits with different architectures

Last week, on August 4, the President of Russia signed the law "On Digital Currency and Digital Rights." Three weeks earlier, the United States legislatively banned its own digital dollar, Europe entered final negotiations on the digital euro, the Bank for International Settlements conducted its first real-money settlements in the Agorá project, and Mastercard closed the acquisition of a company specializing in stablecoin settlements.

All five are answering the same question, and Russia's answer differs in one respect: only here is the state building two payment circuits simultaneously and regulating them differently. This is not just a technical solution but a strategic choice that will determine market development for years to come.

The dispute is not about technology

The bottleneck is not message transmission: according to SWIFT statistics, three out of four payments reach the recipient bank within ten minutes. Time and money are consumed by the "last mile"—compliance checks, reconciliation, and crediting at the local bank. The real subject of the dispute becomes visible if you ask whose obligation you hold in your hands at the moment of settlement—the central bank's, the commercial bank's, a private issuer company's, or the payment network's.

This balance is the raw material of the banking economy: it is what they earn on, what they issue loans from, and what they keep clients for. Nearly every decision of the past year is designed to ensure this balance does not leave the banking system.

Mikhail Kulakov, lead engineer-analyst of the Blockchain direction at DiSoft, explains: the question "whose obligation is this" is a question of where the primary record is kept and who has the right to modify it. The central bank's obligation lives on the regulator's platform, the bank's own obligation lives in its accounting core, and the token issuer's obligation lives in a third-party network to which the bank has read-only access. Three answers yield three reconciliation models and three recovery scenarios in the event of a failure, and the "last mile" is largely the time spent reconciling these records with each other, not a data transmission delay.

What the Russian law introduces

The law takes effect on September 1, 2026, mandatory registration of crypto exchangers in the Bank of Russia registry begins on July 1, 2027, and some requirements for intermediaries start in September 2027. A new category of professional participants emerges—digital depositories: they maintain records of clients' crypto assets, keep primary and backup IT infrastructure in Russia, and compensate for damages in cases of unlawful write-offs. Crypto exchangers with own funds of at least 15 million rubles are legalized.

The criteria for admitting assets to trading are enshrined in the law itself—a market capitalization above 5 trillion rubles, an average daily turnover above 1 trillion rubles, and a trading history of at least five years, all averaged over two years. Bitcoin and ether currently meet these criteria. For non-qualified investors, a limit of 300 thousand rubles per year per intermediary is set, along with mandatory testing. The provision that will affect practice earlier than others is settlements under foreign trade contracts. It has been in effect since September 2024 in an experimental mode by the Bank of Russia, and the new law makes it permanent.

Domestic payments in cryptocurrency remain prohibited. Not only custodial wallets are allowed, but also self-custodial ones; for withdrawals exceeding 100 thousand rubles to an external address, a 48-hour delay is provided—it will take effect on September 1, 2027. The list itself does not prohibit owning assets outside it: the criteria relate to public offerings through Russian intermediaries, not to property rights, and digital currency is recognized as property with judicial protection. Foreign and non-custodial wallets are not banned, and the holder of the access key is recognized as the owner.

The obligation to declare the very fact of ownership is not directly established—except for state and municipal employees. Two or more transactions per month exceeding 3.5 million rubles are considered by the law as a sign of organized activity requiring intermediary status. Tax arises upon sale, not upon holding: 13% on income up to 2.4 million rubles and 15% above that, with a 3-NDFL declaration due by April 30. The holding-period exemption applicable to certain types of property does not apply to digital currency, according to Ministry of Finance clarifications. From July 1, 2027, banks are required to refuse transfers to unlicensed crypto services—the channel for funding foreign platforms through Russian banks is closed.

Two circuits instead of one

Domestically, starting September 1, mandatory acceptance of the digital ruble begins—a state retail currency that the United States has legislatively rejected until the end of 2030 and that Europe is only designing so far. Externally, the circulation of private global assets is legalized. Both instruments are used simultaneously but separated by purpose: domestically—only the public circuit, externally—only the private one.

The logic of the separation is simple if you look at obligations. Domestically, the balance remains with the Bank of Russia: this provides traceability of settlements and independence from external infrastructure—while simultaneously raising the same privacy question that led the United States to abandon the retail model. Externally, an asset is used that no transaction participant issues—which is why it works where correspondent channels have become difficult to navigate due to external restrictions in recent years. The sanctions context is not named in the law, but it is the most obvious explanation for the foreign trade provision: the issue is not the transfer fee but the availability of the channel itself.

The combination of public and private circuits is not unique in itself—China, the UAE, and India do the same. The peculiarity of the Russian model lies in the rigid segmentation by payment purpose, and it is shaped by external circumstances no less than by design. The divergence in trajectories is explained not only by regulatory but also by architectural choices, Kulakov adds. Retail central bank projects in BRICS are built on centralized platforms where the distributed ledger is used selectively. Stablecoins live in the opposite paradigm—public networks, an open ledger, and no single operator. Therefore, the two circuits are not two interfaces but two different data models: in one, the platform operator creates the record; in the other, the network creates it, and the bank only observes, with the main work falling on the reconciliation layer between them.

The world, the market, and the practical takeaway

The American framework took shape over a year. The GENIUS Act (July 2025) requires full backing of stablecoins with liquid assets and explicitly prohibits paying holders income on the token. And on July 11, 2026, the ban on a retail central bank digital currency became law: until the end of 2030, the Fed is not authorized to issue a CBDC. Europe chose the opposite instrument. According to ECB data, in 2022 international card schemes accounted for 61% of eurozone card payments, and thirteen countries depend on them entirely. That is why the digital euro is being designed as a public alternative with zero yield and a holding limit; the regulation has not been adopted, a pilot is planned for the second half of 2027, and the first issuance is slated for 2029.

Mastercard closed the acquisition of BVNK on August 3, with the announced March price at up to $1.8 billion, including about $300 million in contingent payments. The asset's value is largely regulatory: BVNK obtained a MiCA license in Malta in February 2026, valid across the entire EU. In July, Visa launched a stablecoin issuance platform for banks. Card networks are embedding new instruments into the settlement layer while retaining the client and the rules: they do not need the balance; they earn on the flow. The share of stablecoins in cross-border retail payments in 2025 was 0.31%.

The only one to report real-money settlements is the Bank for International Settlements project. Results were published on July 30: about thirty participants, including five central banks, 30 transactions in six currencies totaling around one million dollars, with an average settlement time of 80 seconds compared to several business days in correspondent practice. At the same time, the platform operated autonomously, without connection to existing systems and without real compliance procedures. The engineering value of Agorá is that there is no need to migrate accounting anywhere: the tokenized deposit remains the obligation of the same bank, the ledger handles atomicity and synchronization, and data migration is not required, Kulakov explains. But compliance checks, sanctions screening, and dispute resolution remained outside the scope, and these are precisely what constitute the "last mile"—so 80 seconds remain a characteristic of the settlement layer, not of the end-to-end payment.

Country trajectories are diverging. Of the eleven BRICS countries, all are studying digital currencies, nine have reached the pilot stage, but none has fully launched a system. China, from January 1, 2026, reclassified the digital yuan in commercial bank accounts as a deposit obligation—interest accrues on it and deposit insurance applies, meaning Beijing decided to return the balance to banks through yield. India is moving in the opposite direction: the volume of the digital rupee in circulation declined for the first time by 24% in the 2025/26 fiscal year, and Brazil in November 2025 shut down the Drex platform, admitting that the technology failed to ensure privacy and security.

The digital ruble looks modest—as of July 1, over 25 million digital rubles were in circulation, about $320 thousand for the entire country—but in two months, acceptance becomes mandatory for companies with revenue above 120 million rubles. For foreign trade participants, the law removes some legal uncertainty within the Russian circuit but does not regulate the external side of the transaction: the willingness of a foreign counterparty to accept payment is determined by its own compliance and assessment of sanctions risk. Bitcoin and ether, admitted to trading, are volatile, which is an independent risk for contracts with deferred payment.

Mandatory acceptance of the digital ruble creates a forced flow from bank balances into a central bank obligation—exactly what everyone else is avoiding. The question for the next year and a half is not whether the circuits of different countries will align, but whether Russia will repeat China's maneuver—accrue yield or otherwise return the balance to banks. The answer will be visible in the dynamics of the deposit base by the end of 2027.

My conclusion: Russia has chosen a pragmatic but risky strategy—using cryptocurrencies as a tool for foreign economic activity while simultaneously strengthening control over domestic settlements through the digital ruble. The success of this model will depend not on technology but on the ability to maintain a balance between attractiveness to business and the rigidity of regulatory oversight. If the yield on the digital ruble remains zero and compliance barriers for foreign trade remain high, we may see a liquidity outflow into gray schemes—precisely the risk that has already emerged in Brazil and India.