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Transferring $200 abroad costs on average 6.4% of the amount, while through a bank it is almost 15%. Moreover, the payment message itself reaches the recipient bank within ten minutes. I cite these figures not by chance: they illustrate the key problem around which the entire new architecture of digital settlements in Russia is built.

All the remaining time and almost all the money go to what happens after the message is delivered. Over one month, five different approaches were tried to close this gap. This is not about data transmission technology, but about whose obligation you hold in your hands at the moment of settlement — the central bank's, a commercial bank's, a private issuer company's, or a payment network's. This determines whom you turn to if a payment goes missing, and who uses the money while it sits in the system.

What the law changes

The President signed the law "On Digital Currency and Digital Rights" on August 4. It takes effect on September 1, 2026, mandatory registration of crypto exchangers in the Bank of Russia registry — from July 1, 2027, and part of the requirements for intermediaries — from September 2027. A new category of professional participants emerges — digital depositories: they maintain records of clients' crypto assets, hold primary and backup IT infrastructure in Russia, and compensate damages in cases of unauthorized debiting. Crypto exchangers with own funds of at least 15 million rubles are legalized.

The criteria for admitting assets to trading are enshrined in the law itself: capitalization above 5 trillion rubles, average daily turnover exceeding 1 trillion, and a trading history of at least five years, all averaged over two years. Today, bitcoin and ether fall under these criteria. For non-qualified investors, a limit of 300 thousand rubles per year with one intermediary and mandatory testing are established.

Domestic payments in cryptocurrency remain prohibited. Not only custodial wallets are allowed, but also self-custodial ones; when withdrawing over 100 thousand rubles to an external address, a 48-hour delay is provided — it will take effect from September 1, 2027. The Central Bank's list itself does not prohibit owning assets outside it: the criteria apply to public offerings through Russian intermediaries, not to ownership rights. Foreign and non-custodial wallets are not prohibited; the owner is recognized as the one holding the access key.

Two circuits instead of one

The key feature of the Russian model is strict segmentation by payment purpose. Domestically, from September 1, mandatory acceptance of the digital ruble begins — a state retail currency that the United States has legislatively rejected until the end of 2030 and that Europe is only designing so far. Externally, the circulation of private global assets is legalized. Both instruments are used simultaneously but separated by purpose: domestically — only the public circuit, externally — only the private one.

The logic of the separation is simple if you look at obligations. Domestically, the balance remains with the Bank of Russia: this provides traceability of settlements and independence from external infrastructure — and at the same time raises the same privacy question that led the United States to abandon the retail model. Externally, an asset is used that none of the transaction participants issues — which is why it works where correspondent channels have become difficult to navigate due to external restrictions in recent years. The sanctions context is not named in the law, but it is the most obvious explanation for the foreign economic activity provision: the issue is not the transfer fee, but the availability of the channel itself.

The combination of public and private circuits is not unique — China, the UAE, and India do the same. The distinctiveness of the Russian model lies in strict segmentation by payment purpose, and it is shaped by external circumstances no less than by design.

Global context and practical conclusion

The American framework took shape over a year. The GENIUS Act (July 2025) requires full backing of stablecoins with liquid assets and directly prohibits accruing income to holders for the token. And on July 11, 2026, the ban on a retail central bank digital currency became law: until the end of 2030, the Fed is not authorized to issue a CBDC. Europe chose the opposite instrument. According to ECB data, in 2022 international card schemes accounted for 61% of eurozone card payments, and thirteen countries depend on them entirely. That is why the digital euro is being designed as a public alternative with zero yield and a holding limit; the regulation has not been adopted, a pilot is planned for the second half of 2027, and the first issuance for 2029.

Countries' trajectories diverge. Of the eleven BRICS countries, all are studying digital currencies, nine have reached the pilot stage, but none has fully launched a system. China, from January 1, 2026, reclassified the digital yuan in commercial bank accounts as a deposit obligation — interest accrues on it and deposit insurance applies. India is moving in the opposite direction: the volume of the digital rupee in circulation declined for the first time by 24% in the 2025/26 fiscal year. Brazil, in November 2025, shut down the Drex platform, acknowledging that the technology failed to ensure privacy and security.

The digital ruble looks modest — as of July 1, over 25 million digital rubles were in circulation, about $320 thousand for the entire country — but in two months, acceptance becomes mandatory for companies with revenue above 120 million rubles. Mandatory acceptance creates a forced flow from bank balances into a central bank obligation — exactly what everyone else avoids.

My conclusion: the question for the next year and a half is not whether the circuits of different countries will interconnect, but whether Russia will repeat China's maneuver — accrue income or otherwise return the balance to banks. The answer will be visible in the dynamics of the deposit base by the end of 2027.