Banking spreads on cryptocurrency in Russia: why high fees are doomed to decline
The entry of Russian banks into the cryptocurrency operations market will not lead to the establishment of "predatory" fees in the long term. At the start, spreads will indeed be higher than on classic crypto exchanges, but maintaining a markup of 5–7% or more under real competition will not be possible. I arrive at this conclusion by analyzing the current dynamics and structure of the future regulated market.
Why spreads will first rise and then decline
At the initial stage, banks will be forced to factor significant costs into the price: the cost of liquidity, compliance procedures, risk hedging, and the creation of new infrastructure. In certain products, the markup could reach several basis points, which will deter retail consumers. However, in my estimation, such levels are not sustainable.
The key factor here is market competition, not administrative regulation. As several banks and other supervised players enter the market, margins will begin to compress fairly quickly. The spread itself will be shaped by the market, not the regulator. It will consist of the global price of the crypto asset, the cost of liquidity, hedging, infrastructure expenses, and the specific bank's margin.
The Central Bank of Russia, as I expect, will focus on admission rules, the composition of participants, and infrastructure, rather than setting specific quotes. This means that markups may vary significantly across different banks, and it is precisely this diversity that will drive competition.
Who will win the fight for clients
Within a single bank, the spread will depend on the number of active product users, the volume of real client liquidity, and the cost of liquidity for the credit institution itself. Infrastructure and legal aspects take a back seat.
The winner will be the one with a larger marketing budget and a greater willingness to take risks to dominate the new economy. This is not only about qualified investors. The more liquidity providers and competing banks there are, the closer prices will be to market levels. The mechanism here will resemble the foreign exchange market more than a product with an administratively set tariff.
The mass client is not ready to overpay merely for the word "bank." The stress level of the retail audience has been high since 2022: the Russian user is willing to accept many scenarios except one—an unjustifiably high cost of service. Wealthy clients, however, are a different story. Large capital continues to migrate between jurisdictions, and with an average transaction size of 3–5 million rubles, a person is willing to pay for speed, transparency, and the absence of problems. The question of whom such a client will prefer—their own accountant or a Russian bank—is rhetorical.
My conclusion: the market will quickly weed out inefficient players. Banks that bet on inflated spreads will lose both retail and institutional clients. Only those who offer a fair price for a regulated framework and quality service will survive.