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RAKIB Executive Director Alexander Brazhnikov presented a mixed assessment of the Central Bank's initiative to allow Bitcoin, Ethereum, and USDT into exchange trading. On one hand, it creates a long-awaited legal infrastructure for the market. On the other, the proposed limit of 300,000 rubles per year for non-qualified investors turns retail access into a formality rather than a real financial tool. In essence, a full-fledged market is being created exclusively for qualified participants, who are not restricted by amounts or the list of assets.

What the Central Bank's proposal changes

For the average investor, a fully legal channel for investing in cryptocurrency through domestic intermediaries appears for the first time. However, the 300,000 ruble threshold at each intermediary significantly limits the scale: most active users, accustomed to much higher turnover, will likely continue operating through foreign platforms and P2P networks.

For the qualified investor, the picture is fundamentally different. The absence of restrictions on amounts and assets opens the door to full-fledged trading in all approved cryptocurrencies. This configuration could serve as a signal for wealthy players and drive an influx of institutional capital. Transparent rules reduce uncertainty for those who previously avoided cryptocurrencies due to the risk of freezes and the unclear status of the asset.

The "gray" sector has not yet received a decisive incentive to come out of the shadows. For organizations with multi-million turnovers, existing restrictions are unlikely to prove more attractive than familiar schemes.

Nevertheless, the very fact of legal infrastructure emerging could shrink the uncontrolled zone of the market. Even a moderate shift of operations into the legal framework changes the proportions.

Impact on the economy

The first effect is legalization and growth in tax revenues. A significant portion of Russians' crypto transactions today passes through P2P, foreign exchanges, and exchangers, with taxes paid only partially. The Central Bank's project creates a supervised structure with licensed intermediaries. Given market volumes, even a moderate share of transactions could bring billions of rubles in taxes to the treasury annually, while licensed brokers, exchangers, and asset management companies will pay corporate income tax, VAT, and insurance premiums. Miners currently moving to P2P will be able to officially sell cryptocurrency through regulated intermediaries.

The second effect is a tool for cross-border settlements. The Central Bank has already confirmed its readiness to allow a limited circle of companies to use digital currencies in foreign trade operations, and the admission of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and USDT to public circulation creates the legal basis for this.

Such a tool does not depend on SWIFT, correspondent accounts in dollars and euros, or freezes by Western regulators, which reduces costs and risks in foreign trade. Direct settlements in cryptocurrency eliminate multi-step schemes involving foreign currency and offshore structures.

The third effect is the investment climate. Transparent rules attract wealthy investors, money that was leaving abroad may remain in the Russian financial system, and an industry forms around the market—custodial services, crypto brokers, analytical platforms, asset management companies—creating jobs and a tax base.

Key risks

The first risk is sanctions and geopolitical pressure. Creating a cryptocurrency market in Russia will almost certainly attract the attention of Western regulators, and the risk of secondary sanctions for Russian brokers, exchangers, and their clients is quite real. The use of USDT deserves special mention: the stablecoin issuer could freeze addresses linked to Russian companies at the request of foreign authorities. This creates a false sense of reliability for a tool that could be blocked at a critical moment.

The second risk is concentration among intermediaries. Admitting a limited number of licensed brokers and exchangers creates points of risk concentration: if such an intermediary is hacked, goes bankrupt, or commits fraud, the damage would be very large, and insurance mechanisms for crypto assets are still absent. The third risk is the growth of fraud under the guise of legitimate activity. The official status of cryptocurrencies could be exploited by malicious actors: pseudo-brokers posing as licensed organizations and schemes promising guaranteed returns will emerge, and citizens who believe in state approval will become more vulnerable. The fourth risk is monopolization. Large players who receive licenses first may lobby for stricter requirements for newcomers, leading to high fees, lower service quality, and in the long term, hindering industry development.

How this looks against global practice

Russia is building its own model, and the 300,000 ruble annual limit for non-qualified investors is its most distinctive part. In the US, EU, Brazil, South Korea, and Japan, there are no fixed limits on purchasing cryptocurrencies for citizens: protection is built through mandatory risk disclosure and regulator warnings, not through amount restrictions. The second difference is the narrow list of assets. The requirement of a five-year price history and a list of only three assets place Russia among the most conservative countries. Even Japan, the only major economy with a "whitelist," allows dozens of assets under more flexible criteria, while the Russian approach is a deliberate rejection of nearly the entire altcoin market. The third is the division into qualified and non-qualified investors. This is a transfer of the traditional Russian model of securities market regulation to cryptocurrencies: such a division is atypical for crypto exchanges, where a retail investor can usually buy any available cryptocurrency.

As a result, an "elite" legal market is created for large capital and a limited one for everyone else. In this form, it is more of an experiment dictated by the current Central Bank policy.

The sanctions factor is key here: most of the mentioned countries are integrated into the global financial system, whereas for Russia, many Western exchanges have closed or restricted access. Therefore, the domestic regulated market is initially built as isolated—relying on internal liquidity and a limited circle of friendly counterparties.

My analysis: The Central Bank's initiative is not so much liberalization as managed market segmentation. The 300,000 ruble limit is not investor protection but a filter that cuts off retail demand from institutional flows. In the short term, this will create a "showcase" for large capital, but in the long term, it risks leaving the mass user in the gray zone, amplifying the risks the regulator supposedly seeks to reduce. Subscribe to my Telegram channel to receive expert insights on the cryptocurrency market, AI, and stock markets first.