Competition will force Russian banks to reduce spreads on cryptocurrency.
The launch of banking operations with cryptocurrency in Russia will be accompanied by inflated spreads, but maintaining a markup of 5–7% or higher in a competitive market will not be possible. This is the conclusion I reach by analyzing the current market conditions and the logic of price formation within a regulated framework.
The key factor that will determine the final cost for the client is not the bank's appetite, but the cost of liquidity, the user's willingness to overpay for a regulated service, and the difference compared to traditional fiat transfer channels. At the initial stage, banks will have to factor in significant expenses: compliance, hedging, and building new infrastructure. In certain products, the margin could reach several basis points, which will inevitably be reflected in the final spread.
Why high spreads are a temporary phenomenon
However, sustained spreads of 5–7% or higher in a competitive market are an economic absurdity. As several banks and other regulated players enter the market, the margin will begin to compress fairly quickly. The market, not the regulator, will shape the final spread. It will be composed of the global price of the crypto asset, the cost of liquidity, hedging, infrastructure, and the specific bank's margin.
The Central Bank of Russia, as I see it, will focus on access rules, participant composition, and infrastructure, but will not set specific buy and sell quotes. Therefore, markups may vary significantly across different banks, especially at the start. Within a single bank, the spread will depend on the number of active product users, the volume of real client liquidity, and the cost of liquidity on the balance sheet. Infrastructure and legal costs will remain secondary factors.
Who will win the battle for the client
In this race, victory will go to those with the largest marketing budget and the greatest willingness to take risks to dominate the new economy. This is not only about qualified investors. The more liquidity providers and competition among banks, the closer prices will be to market levels. The mechanism here resembles the currency market, not a product with an administratively set tariff.
The mass client today is not willing to pay for the mere word "bank." This is tied to the level of stress among the retail audience since 2022: the Russian user is willing to accept many scenarios to meet their needs, except one—an unjustifiably high cost of service. Wealthy clients, however, are a different story. Large capital continues to move between countries, and with an average transaction of 3–5 million rubles, a person is willing to pay for speed, transparency, and the absence of problems. Which such a client will prefer—their own accountant or a Russian bank—is a rhetorical question.
My conclusion: a short-term spike in spreads is inevitable, but it merely reflects the costs of transitioning to a regulated market. The medium-term dynamics are clear—competition and large clients will accelerate the reduction of margins to levels comparable to traditional financial instruments.