Crypto news

RAKIB Executive Director Alexander Brazhnikov offered a mixed assessment of the Central Bank's initiative to allow Bitcoin, Ethereum, and USDT into exchange trading. On one hand, it creates long-awaited legal infrastructure, but on the other, the annual limit of 300,000 rubles for non-qualified investors turns retail access into a formality rather than a real financial tool.

In essence, we are witnessing the formation of a two-tier market. For the mass retail investor, a fully legal way to enter cryptocurrency through domestic intermediaries appears for the first time. However, the 300,000 rubles per year cap per intermediary significantly limits the scale: most active users accustomed to turnover several times higher will likely continue operating through foreign platforms and P2P. This calls into question the practical significance of the innovation for a broad audience.

What the Central Bank's proposal changes

Today, cryptocurrency trading in Russia relies on P2P platforms, foreign exchanges, and exchangers. These methods carry a whole set of risks: bank card blocking, fraud, lack of consumer protection, periodic account freezes for Russians at the request of international regulators, and claims from law enforcement agencies.

For a qualified investor, the picture is different. There are no restrictions either on amounts or on the list of assets — all cryptocurrencies admitted to trading on exchange and over-the-counter markets are available. This opens the door to a full-fledged market for professional participants.

Such a configuration could serve as a signal for wealthy investors and spur an influx of institutional capital. Transparent rules reduce uncertainty for those who previously avoided cryptocurrencies due to the risks of freezes and the unclear status of the asset.

Meanwhile, the "gray" sector does not yet receive a decisive incentive to come out of the shadows. For organizations with multi-million turnovers, existing restrictions are unlikely to prove more attractive than their usual schemes.

Nevertheless, the very fact of legal infrastructure emerging can reduce the uncontrolled zone of the market. Even a moderate shift of operations into the legal framework changes the proportions.

Impact on the economy

The first effect is linked to legalization and increased tax revenues. A significant portion of Russians' cryptocurrency operations today passes through P2P, foreign exchanges, and exchangers, and taxes on them, if paid at all, are only partially so.

The Central Bank's project creates a legal structure with supervised intermediaries. Given market volumes, even a moderate share of transactions could bring billions of rubles in taxes to the treasury annually, while licensed brokers, exchangers, and asset management companies will pay corporate income tax, VAT, and insurance premiums. Miners who currently retreat to P2P will be able to officially sell cryptocurrency through regulated intermediaries.

The second effect is a tool for cross-border settlements. The Central Bank has already confirmed its readiness to allow a limited circle of companies to use digital currencies in foreign trade operations, and the admission of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and USDT to public circulation creates a legal basis for this.

Such a tool does not depend on SWIFT, correspondent accounts in dollars and euros, or freezes by Western regulators, which reduces costs and risks in foreign trade. Direct settlements in cryptocurrency eliminate multi-step schemes involving foreign currency and offshore structures.

The third effect is the investment climate. Transparent rules attract wealthy investors, money that flowed abroad may remain in the Russian financial system, and an industry forms around the market — custodial services, crypto brokers, analytical platforms, asset management companies — creating jobs and a tax base.

Key risks

The first risk is sanctions and geopolitical pressure. Creating a cryptocurrency market in Russia will almost certainly attract the attention of Western regulators, and the risk of secondary sanctions for Russian brokers, exchangers, and their clients is quite real.

Separately, the use of USDT deserves attention: the stablecoin issuer may freeze addresses linked to Russian companies at the request of foreign authorities. This creates a false sense of reliability for a tool that could be blocked at a critical moment.

The second risk is concentration among intermediaries. Admitting a limited number of licensed brokers and exchangers creates points of risk concentration: if such an intermediary is hacked, goes bankrupt, or commits fraud, the damage would be very large, and insurance mechanisms for crypto assets are currently absent.

The third risk is tied to the growth of fraud under the guise of legitimate activity. The official status of cryptocurrencies could be exploited by malicious actors: pseudo-brokers posing as licensed organizations and schemes promising guaranteed returns will emerge, and citizens who believe in state approval will become more vulnerable.

The fourth risk is monopolization. Large players who obtain licenses first may lobby for stricter requirements for newcomers, leading to high fees, lower service quality, and in the long term, hindering industry development.

How this looks against global practice

Russia is building its own model, and the 300,000 rubles per year limit for non-qualified investors is its most distinctive part. In the US, EU, Brazil, South Korea, and Japan, there are no fixed limits on citizens' cryptocurrency purchases: protection is built through mandatory risk disclosure and regulator warnings, not through amount restrictions.

The second difference is the narrow list of assets. The requirement of a five-year price history and a list of only three assets place Russia among the most conservative countries. Even Japan, the only major economy with a "whitelist," admits dozens of assets under more flexible criteria, whereas the Russian approach is a deliberate rejection of nearly the entire altcoin market.

The third is the division into qualified and non-qualified investors. This is a transfer of the traditional Russian model of securities market regulation to cryptocurrencies: such a division is atypical for crypto exchanges, where a retail investor can usually buy any available cryptocurrency.

As a result, an "elite" legal market is created for large capital and a limited one for everyone else. In this form, it is more of an experiment dictated by the Central Bank's current policy.

The sanctions factor is key here. Most of the mentioned countries are integrated into the global financial system, whereas for Russia many Western exchanges have closed or restricted access, so the domestic regulated market is initially built as isolated — relying on internal liquidity and a limited circle of friendly counterparties.

My view: the Central Bank's proposal is a cautious step toward legalization, but it risks remaining decorative. The 300,000 rubles limit does not solve the problem of mass demand, and the narrow list of assets cuts off innovation. If the regulator truly wants to create a working market, it will have to reconsider both restrictions — otherwise, the "gray" zone will continue to thrive, and legal infrastructure will remain niche.